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Abstract
This study tests two theories of the official propagation of 
the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in Marxist-Leninist states. 
Such nationalism is understood as the manipulation of a range of public 
pronouncements, most importantly on national history and the cultural 
heritage, designed to confer on states of this type 'nationalist' 
legitimacy. It focusses on three such states characterised by a marked 
lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state - 
the USSR, the GDR, and Yugoslavia. The analysis tests the two more 
widely encountered and influential theories which attempt to account 
for this phenomenon, 'deradicalisation' and 'tactical opportunism', 
distinct models united by their positing of elite manipulation of extant 
mass national sentiment in communist societies.
Bearing in mind these two theories, the study attempts to throw 
light on the phenomenon as it manifests itself in each of the three 
states. In addition, given that it has been claimed that the extent to 
which communist states resort to the exploitation of nationalism may be 
related to the ethnic structure or 'situation' of such states, the study 
attempts to explore whether the 'type' of state selected reveals common 
behavioural patterns. In this 'type' of communist state, we might assume 
that officially sanctioned nationalism either would not be permitted or 
would be held on a tighter leash than in other Marxist-Leninist societies 
not characterised by such lack of congruence between nation and state.
On top of the disincentive presented to all communist states - that 
nationalism conflicts with the internationalism and class analysis of 
Marxism, this would be due to the possibility that (in the cases of the 
USSR and Yugoslavia) such behaviour would threaten to alienate ethnic 
groups other than the Russians and the Serbs, thus potentially 
destabilising the political system, and in the case of the GDR, because 
it would risk sustaining popular identification with a wider German 
nation which includes an entity beyond the state's borders perceived as 
committed to the GDR's destruction - West Germany.
The case of the USSR suggests that elements of both theories 
account for aspects of the use by the Soviet state of Russian nationalism,
ix
but that both are also misleading and obscure important aspects of its 
exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Most importantly, they 
both overlook the fact that the USSR has exploited Russian nationalism 
only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having been resolved 
by the leadership at a relatively early point in the development of the 
Soviet state that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and 
its ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since 
this decision without essential changes, being marked by relatively 
stable continuity rather than further 'deradicalisation' or regular 
'tactical' oscillations.
The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment 
represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' 
thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring as it does during 
the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following the 
failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce enthusiasm 
for, or loyalty to, the state. As with the case of the USSR, and as we 
might expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the 
population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology, or taken the 
form of 'communist nationalism' rather than nationalism pure and simple.
As hypothesised, the GDR desisted from attempts to encourage feelings of 
German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that is, so long as the authorities 
took the doctrinal position that there was a single Germany whose 
reunification should be striven for - or encouraged a view of the nation 
as wider than the state.
Communist Yugoslavia, where state-sponsored nationalism turns out 
to have been the exception rather than the rule, suggests that only the 
'tactical' explanation may be satisfactory in accounting for the central 
leadership's occasional exploitation of, or acquiescence in, Serbian 
nationalism. Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history 
of post-war Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between 
nation and state has acted as an important restraining influence on the 
development of such an ideological shift.
XThe three case-studies reveal that theories of both 'deradicalisation' 
and 'tactics' as applied to the communist uses of nationalism are flawed 
and are not universally applicable. The study also reveals little 
apparent correlation between the ethnic 'situation' of the three states 
studied and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the 
national sentiment of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. Nevertheless, 
with the important exception of a communist state without a decisively 
dominant ethnic group such as Yugoslavia, the study suggests the at least 
partial accuracy of the central proposition of the 'deradicalisation' 
theory - that Marxist-Leninist regimes at some stage partially reconcile 
themselves to a range of traditional sentiments and attitudes, including 
nationalism, and attempt to cater for them in order to shore up their 
legitimacy. Aspects of the 'tactical' theory, by contrast constitute a 
useful description of the Yugoslav resort to 'communist nationalism', as 
well as fluctuations in the Soviet exploitation of the phenomenon.
1Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to analyse and account for the 
phenomenon of the official uses of the nationalism of the dominant 
ethnic group in three Marxist-Leninist states characterised by a 
marked lack of congruence between the boundaries of the nation and 
the state. After defining the key concepts used in the analysis, 
this introduction examines the range of available pertinent theories, 
sets out the arguments of the study, and elaborates the methodology 
of the thesis.
The first problem such an exercise must tackle is to define in 
what sense ’nationalism’ is to be understood. According to the most 
influential existing definition, that of Hans Kohn, nationalism is a 
political creed that focusses loyalty on the nation-state either 
existing or desired.^- Yet because there has been a tendency to see 
the significant historical and sociological variant of nationalism as 
a spontaneous mass or intelligentsia-led social process, few writers 
have attempted to grapple with the form of the phenomenon inspired 
and directed by the state.
Nationalism has come overwhelmingly to be seen as a political
creed which threatens, by treating as illegitimate, all polities where
the nation does not coincide with the state. From its origins in the
French Revolution, to its contribution to the break-up of the Austro-
Hungarian, Ottoman and West European colonial empires, nationalism has
been seen as a threat to states which do not coincide wit,h nations -
either as a mobilisational tool of intelligentsias, or as a consequence
2
of the spontaneous consciousness of wider classes. Hence, the study 
of the concept, despite the fact that it by definition embraces wider 
phenomena, has focussed largely on nationalisms which proclaim anti­
status quo goals such as independence, unity, or national self­
aggrandisement involving violence. This tendency has been reinforced 
by the emergence in the recent history of Western states of ethnic 
separatism, which, coupled with the nationalist movements characteristic 
of wide areas of the Third World, has given rise to a rich literature
2concerned with the causes of the phenomenon. Seeking to understand 
why national self-consciousness grips certain groups at certain points 
in history, most modern theories have attempted to explain nationalism 
in terms of modernisation or 'social mobilisation' in the context of
cultural pluralism, especially where such pluralism is juxtaposed
3
with economic or other forms of inequality. As such, the study of 
nationalism has come to be identified with spontaneous social phenomena, 
and an anti-status quo creed. Hence we find that a recently published 
work entitled Nations and Nationalism restricts its understanding of 
nationalism to 'a political principle, which holds that the political
4
and the national unit should be congruent'.
Yet, it would seem, such approaches suggest the confusion of a 
part with the whole. As Henry Krisch has observed, numerous polities 
can be identified where 'nationalism' is an induced phenomenon, serving 
to integrate the populace in the interests of the political leadership.^ 
Indeed, such a writer as Paul Brass, writing on ethnicity in Northern 
India, has rightly reinforced the under-emphasised half of Kohn's 
definition by conceiving of nationalism as 'the process by which ethnic 
groups ... are mobilised for action to attain political ends'. Such 
'nation-building' in the context of system-maintenance may variously 
take the form of the state attempting to build up a sense of national 
identity from a number of nationalities, identifying the state with 
one of a number of ethnic groups, encouraging a sense of national 
cohesion across class-lines in a nation-state, or attempting to destroy 
one sense of national identity and build up another.
'Communist nationalism' ’which, it is argued in this study, is 
the form of nationalism which invariably emerges in Marxist-Leninist 
states, is understood in this thesis as a variant of 'state' or 'induced' 
nationalism involving political manipulation by a Marxist-Leninist state, 
which must at the same time guard such elements of official ideology 
as 'internationalism' and the 'class' approach to the analysis of 
history and culture. It manifests itself as official, or officially 
sanctioned behaviour on the part of the Party-State apparatus in which 
biases towards a historically or demographically dominant ethnic group 
are evident (in the case of a multinational Marxist-Leninist state),
3or where a 'class-based' view of the historical and cultural heritage 
partially disappears in practice, giving way to a more positive 
evaluation of the national past. 'Communist nationalism' means either 
that elements of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group are 
combined with at least pro forma acknowledgements of the importance 
of 'internationalism' and class analysis, or that more than usually 
unadulterated nationalism may be tolerated on tactical grounds for a 
time, to be followed by the inevitable reassertion of the need for 
more orthodox Marxist-Leninist elements in analysis and writing. 
'Communist nationalism' is thus the bizarre welding of mutually exclusive 
world views into the state ideology of Marxist-Leninist regimes, or 
alternatively, the regular fluctuation between these world views.
Even the more casual observers of communist affairs tend to be 
aware of the fact that this form of nationalism has characterised the 
behaviour of many of the world's states which define themselves as 
Marxist-Leninist. It is well documented that where such regimes have 
come into existence, 'internationalist' attitudes of indifference or 
hostility to the pre-revolutionary history or culture of the nation 
(or predominant nation) concerned, while perhaps holding sway in the 
early period of revolutionary euphoria, has been the exception rather 
than the rule. Frequently, however, there is a tendency to conceive 
of such 'communist nationalism' as an aspect or manifestation of the 
more widely studied phenomenon of 'national communism', the term used 
to describe Marxist-Leninist regimes which have refused fully to support 
the Soviet Union internationally, a political choice which has usually 
(but not always) involved departures from the Soviet model with regard 
to internal policies. In a number of instances, policies or behaviour 
which we might define as 'communist nationalist' have indeed roughly 
coincided with international reorientations. The most celebrated case, 
of course, involves the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of the 
doctrine of 'socialism in one country' in the mid-1920s was followed 
only a few years later by the establishment of more traditional official 
views on Russia's people, history, and culture. In later years, the 
appearance of 'communist nationalism' also appeared to coincide in a 
number of instances with the assertion by a number of regimes of their 
independence from Moscow, occasionally to the point of isolationism.
4While we should not ignore the occasionally manifest ’national 
nihilism1 which in a number of instances accompanied charges of 
Soviet 'revisionism', the cases of China from the 'Great Leap 
Forward' onwards, Albania from the early 1960s, Romania from the
o
mid to late 1960s, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge come to mind.
Such a coincidence of 'communist nationalism' with 'national 
communism' has by no means always been the case, however, and the 
cause of the former is obviously not necessarily the latter. The case 
of 'national communism' par excellence - Yugoslavia - would appear to 
be the communist state least renowned for any tendencies towards 
'communist nationalism'. Moreover, in the case of a number of allies 
of the Soviet Union - Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, 
Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam, the close 'internationalist' relationship 
with Moscow does not appear to have inhibited officially sponsored 
nationalistic exploitation of the pre-revolutionary past designed to
9
enhance the legitimacy of such regimes - or 'communist nationalism'.
It would appear that whereas the spread of 'national communism' 
is by no means inevitable while the Soviet Union remains convinced of 
the need for political satellites, 'communist nationalism' appears to 
be a virtually universal characteristic of Marxist-Leninist systems 
(the apparent exception being Yugoslavia). Why should this be so?
In attempting to account for the official use of the nationalism 
of the dominant ethnic group within a given Marxist-Leninist state, few 
disputes have emerged among observers concerning its function: there 
is a wide consensus (with one important exception) that the identification 
of nation and state serves to enhance political legitimacy. Early 
attempts at political socialisation failed to alter the political culture 
in the sense of forging loyalty to class, and the wider popular focus 
of political loyalty remained the nation. Hence, creating congruence 
between the 'official' and 'dominant' political cultures remained a 
powerful, if problematic, potential generator of allegiance to Marxist- 
Leninist regimes.
5The major area of contention revolves around the question of 
the wider significance of the use by Marxist-Leninist regimes of 
'communist nationalism'. Theorists of 'deradicalisation' argue that 
the development signals an irreversible reconciliation to a wider 
range of traditional values, which may even suggest the ultimate 
'withering away' of the ideology of the regime and its transformation 
into a totally 'de-Marxified' nationalist dictatorship; by contrast 
the 'tactical' or 'temporary opportunist' approach argues that the 
phenomenon is a constant, even unremarkable, feature of regimes which 
will grasp any available ploy capable of shoring up the power of the 
Party. Once the need for such concessions is removed, so it is claimed, 
a reversion to ideological norms invariably occurs.
The major spokesmen for the 'deradicalisation' school have been 
Robert Tucker and Robert W e s s o n . ^  They are united by the view that 
'radical movements which survive without remaking the world tend to 
undergo deradicalisation', or make 'an accommodation to the world as 
it stands'.^ While Marxist-Leninist dogma continues to supply a 
legitimacy of sorts in such societies, the state in the post-revolutionary 
or -totalitarian-coercive stage can no longer be sure of the allegiance 
(or quiescence) of its citizens. Thus, runs the argument, all mature 
communist states increasingly attempt to secure the loyalty of their 
citizens by a number of means, of which the two most important are the 
replacement of idealistic collectivism with individualistic consumerism, 
and an increasing use of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group 
at the expense of consistent revolutionary proletarian internationalism 
and the 'class' approach to history and culture.
>
The 'deradicalisation' process has been analysed by numerous
additional observers whose phraseological apparatus varies, but whose
message is essentially the same. Leszek Ko^akowski notes the emergence
of a 'real state ideology' which 'appeals to the attitudes, expectations
12
and values that existed before anyone had heard of communism'. Both 
Peter Ludz and Victor Zaslavsky have argued the 'ficticization' of 
official doctrine, as the legitimising 'operating ideology', which 
includes nationalism, moves further away from orthodox revolutionary 
doctrine in the 'consolidating phase' of a Marxist-Leninist state.
6Henry Krisch posits a transition from a ’heroic age' which stresses 
drastic social transformation in the service of millenarian goals to 
later post-mobilisational development marked by appeals to conservative 
values, while Maria Markus has stressed a growing body of 'covert'
practices which constitute an attempt to confer 'traditional legitimacy'
t • . 1 3on Marxist-Leninst regimes.
There appear to be two serious shortcomings with the 
'deradicalisation' approach, as far as it has been developed. The 
first is that while it claims that ideological variations have occurred 
in the form of there being 'more' nationalism in the later, compared 
to the earlier periods in the life of communist states, no exponent of 
this approach has attempted to argue specifically what this means, or 
to 'operationalise' the argument empirically. While the school of 
interpretation may have much truth, the 'deradicalisation' approach 
clearly lacks a methodology for the investigation and explanation of 
ideological variations.
The second shortcoming is that while it suggests incremental
change, the approach lacks an account of the limits of ideological
change in Marxist-Leninist states, or the telos of such trends. This
is aside from the prima facie implausible accounts of such observers
as Yanov, Lendvai and Wesson, who forecast the evolution of such states
into more conventional, authoritarian states which will at some stage
shed their Marxist-Leninist baggage, and become de-Marxified nationalist 
14
dictatorships.
According to the 'tactical' model, by contrast, the official use
of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group, rather than being
understood deterministically as a symptom of a unilinear 'deradicalisation'
process, is seen as a temporary weapon used by communist states in
situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat. The classic
formulation of this approach, stimulated by the Stalin experience, is
that of Frederick Barghoorn:
When the Party feels strong, it tends, other 
things being equal, to reduce concessions to 
popular traditions and attitudes. It tends 
to broaden its symbolic and attitudinal base 
when it feels threatened.^
7Analysts such as S. Enders Wimbush have continued to apply
Barghoorn's model of the Soviet case, interpreting the various phenomena
which fall under the rubric of the official uses of nationalism as
'temporary pacificers'.^  The model has also been applied, if somewhat
more tentatively, to other Marxist-Leninist states, as in Bogdan
Denitch's view that segments of the Yugoslav League of Communists 'may
be willing to make occasional tactical alliances with national sentiment',
despite the inevitable subsequent crackdown.^ Others, such as Andrew
Janos, and George Klein and Milan Reban, have seen tactical 'ethnic
pragmatism', or using nationalism at 'convenience' as a phenomenon
18
applicable to communist states in general. Archie Brown has argued
that it is crises, triggered by other stimuli, which produce such
political situations 'in which the strength and direction of political
change may be strongly influenced by the dominant - and no longer dormant -
19
political culture'. While Brown's example is Czechoslovakia in the 
mid-1960s, this interpretation would also embrace communist states 
tactically employing nationalism (given that the 'focus of political 
loyalty' is held to be one of the elements of political culture).
Again, the problems this approach raises relate to the questions 
it does not tackle. Does the tendency to use the 'temporary weapon' 
increase as time goes on in Marxist-Leninist states, or after it has 
proven itself as a mobilisational tool, and at what point does 'temporary' 
or 'tactical' become, to all intents and purposes, permanent? Is the 
official use of nationalism as a temporary ploy equally available to 
all Marxist-Leninist states, or is it, again, related to the ethnic 
structure of a given communist state?
>
The above two approaches essentially argue that communist
nationalism can be explained by political elites exploiting the extant
emotional force of loyalty to the nation, which early attempts in the
sphere of political socialisation did not succeed in eradicating. In
the words of Henry Krisch 'in communist countries ... nationalism is
20
the product of the decisions and attitudes of elites'. It is 'an
induced, deliberately cultivated factor which serves certain interests
21
of a political leadership'. Disagreement between the 'deradicalisation' 
and 'tactical' schools is restricted to the chronological pattern and
8tendency of the phenomenon. However, a third approach sees a more 
active role played by mass sentiment, viewed as a fluctuating rather 
than unchanging phenomenon, and interprets the actions of the state 
as more reactive to the national mood than to internal or external 
threats.
Observers who support this interpretation, which we might term 
'reactive acquiescence', point to an array of social, spiritual, and 
political stimuli which have aroused spontaneous nationalism, to which 
the communist state has, in turn, accommodated itself. In the case of 
the Soviet Union, numerous observers have attempted to account for the 
perceived re-emergence of official Russian nationalism, which coincided 
with the crystallisation of an unofficial Russian nationalist movement 
in the mid-1960s, in terms of this explanation. Jack Haney, for example, 
has pointed to social factors such as 'increasing industrialisation, 
pollution and the destruction of natural resources' as catalysts, while 
Roy Medvedev, Ludmila Alexeeva and Thomas Bird suggest as reasons growing
apathy and disenchantment with official ideology, and a sense of 'spiritual
22
and moral degradation'. Mary McAuley has pointed to a 'social identity
crisis' where loyalty to class and state are no longer options, which is
analogous to Gail Lapidus' view that Russian nationalism can be understood
as a consequence of modernisation, ethnic affiliation providing emotional
23
reassurance after the destruction of traditional social arrangements.
John Dunlop finds the immediate cause in Khrushchev's anti-religious 
24
campaign. Spontaneous reaction to the threat of China, biological
attrition revealed by the 1970 census results, and increasingly assertive
25
minority nationalism have also figured in such explanations.
Similarly, Zeline Ward, in attempting to account for the emergence
of official nationalism in East Germany, has pointed to the 'monolithic
sameness of industrial technology' which affects 'most industrial 
26
societies'. Further, the view of communist nationalism as a spontaneous
emergence 'from below' fits better with a frequently encountered
interpretation of Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia - a phenomenon
usually inspired among the broad intelligentsia in response to specific
social and political catalysts, which, in turn, is tolerated for a time
27
by the state apparatus.
9On the face of it, such accounts would appear implausible.
Aside from the fact that communist regimes must ipso facto at least 
appear to espouse and propagate an internationalist philosophy, which 
necessarily sees nationalism (as opposed to legitimate elements of 
'national sentiment') as a dangerous survivial of the pre-revolutionary 
order, such regimes have not been noted in their general behaviour for 
the co-opting of public opinion, particularly where such opinion is 
inconsistent with the state's avowed ideology.
A final approach which should be considered is that the official
use of nationalism in Marxist-Leninist states is neither manipulative
28
nor reactive, nor a combination of the two, but purely 'expressive'.
Applications of this interpretation frequently refer to the case of
Stalin. Robert Tucker, in his biography of Stalin as a revolutionary,
argues that in his early years, Stalin's sense of 'historic mission' led
him to make the 'requisite psychic break with his native Georgianness'
and to identify himself with the wider revolutionary stage of Russia.
Stalin, according to Tucker, consistently modelled himself, both
intellectually and in a more general cultural sense, on the Russian
revolutionary, of whom his ideal was Lenin. If the identification in
his early years was with the revolutionary Russia, with the later
consolidation of his personal power came a gradual identification with
29
the Russian state, stretching deep into the pre-revolutionary past.
Implying the same view that the official Russian nationalism which
emerged under Stalin was a product of the General Secretary's
identification with Russia's destiny rather than a conscious desire to
manipulate the populace for other political ends, Adam Ulam asks
rhetorically with reference to Stalin, 'Why the frantic Russian
nationalism of his last years?' He answers:
This undoubtedly represented the final state of 
Stalin's own Russian chauvinism rather than a 
response to specific political needs or apprehensions 
[my emphasis]. To be sure, in the so-called Zhdanov 
campaign there was also an element of historical 
caution: the USSR had to be immunised against 
Western ideas so that such ideas would not corrupt 
Russia's intellectual elite as they had after 
another victorious war, that of 1812-1815. But 
these precautions were not connected to any fear 
for his own power, which at the time was threatened 
by only one enemy - old age.30
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The ’expressive’ view is of particular importance since it is the only 
approach which does not assume that communist nationalism constitutes 
an attempt by the state to enhance its legitimacy by attempting to 
identify itself with the nation, either by unilaterally initiating 
nationalism, or permitting its spontaneous manifestation.
Given the influence of traditional views which until recently
had it that the goal of legitimacy was of little importance to communist
31
states, particularly during the Stalin period, the absence of an 
intention to legitimise the state (as distinct from whether the various 
phenomena which constitute communist nationalism functioned to legitimise 
it) is a possibility which should be considered. Nevertheless, we 
should bear in mind that such an explanation conflicts with the fact 
that political elites, communist or otherwise, have generally been 
concerned above all with the preservation of their power, and hence have 
tended to tailor their political behaviour to this end. Furthermore, 
in communist regimes ideology has traditionally played a particularly 
important role in the rationalisation of the political system, so we 
would tend to assume that ideological changes would be carefully weighed 
up and considered rather than being subject to caprice.
We may conclude that the phenomenon of nationalism in communist 
states has been explained in three ways: as the product of elite 
manipulation of a constant, unchanging popular national sentiment 
(interpreted alternatively as either 'deradicalisation' or 'tactics'), 
elite reaction to a fluctuating national sentiment, or simply the 
expression of the national sentiment of the leadership without reference 
to mass sentiment.
>
Clearly it is not within the scope of a single thesis thoroughly 
to analyse the dynamics of this form of nationalism, and to make judgments 
on the available explanations for it, within the communist world as a 
whole. However, it is possible to throw light on the various forms of 
behaviour engendered in one 'type' of communist state. The fact that 
within the spectrum of communist states multinational Yugoslavia is the 
single country not renowned for attempting to achieve legitimacy by 
exploiting the nationalism of its dominant ethnic group, suggests that,
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rather than correlation with ’national communism' explaining where 
we tend to find 'communist nationalism' (as opposed to the related 
but separate issue of how we explain the emergence of 'communist 
nationalism' in a given state), there might be a relationship between 
the extent of the use of the latter and the ethnic structure or 'situation' 
of a given Marxist-Leninist state. This possibility has in fact been 
suggested by Archie Brown. Brown argues that the extent to which 
nationalism is used in a Marxist-Leninist state may be related to how 
'risk-laden' it is, which, in turn, is related to the ethnic structure 
of the society (that is, the fewer non-core ethnic groups within a state, 
the fewer the groups likely to be alienated by the particularistic 
ideology of nationalism). Brown argues that the other factor instrumental 
in determining.the 'extent' to which a Marxist-Leninist state resorts to 
'communist nationalism' is the degree to which it has satisfied the other 
principal indicator, in his view, of 'deradicalisation' - the attempt to 
appeal to individualistic consumerism. Although Brown argues that most 
communist states attempt to use both as means to legitimacy, he indicates 
that the case of the extreme nationalism (or 'communist nationalism' in
the terms of this study) of Romania, for example, may in part be explained
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by that state s inability to meet the demands of consumerism.
In order to explore the possibility that the extent to which 
'communist nationalism' is used in a given Marxist-Leninist state is 
related to its ethnic structure (or 'situation'), the 'type' selected 
for analysis in this study is that characterised by a marked lack of 
congruence between the boundaries of the nation and the state, where we 
might hypothesise that a degree of restraint would be displayed in the 
extent to which nationalism is exploited. To this end, the cases of the 
USSR, the GDR and Yugoslavia have been selected for analysis. Of course 
there are obvious differences in the ethnic 'situation' of the three 
states. The USSR and Yugoslavia are both multinational states, but 
whereas in the former the 'dominant ethnic group' has historically been 
the most powerful in political and economic terms (as well as in demographic 
terms for most of this century), its equivalent in the latter, Serbia, 
constitutes ethnically the country's largest minority (as opposed to the 
Russian majority), is, economically, a less developed territory than large 
areas of the country, whose position of would-be predominance in the state
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began far more recently, and, moreover, has been more vigorously opposed 
by relatively strong ethnic rivals to an extent never experienced by 
Russia. The GDR, by contrast, is in ethnic terms a virtually homogeneous 
state which, however, despite the protestations of GDR ideologists, 
remains part of a wider German nation. Irrespective of these differences, 
however, the three states share a marked lack of congruence between the 
boundaries of the nation and the state, a situation in which, we might 
hypothesise, a degree of restraint would be displayed in the extent to 
which nationalism was exploited.
The question arises as to how the four 'theories’ of communist 
nationalism, as set out above, can be tested in the three Marxist-Leninist 
states selected for comparison. With regard to the 'reactive' and 
'expressive' models, the researcher strikes immediate difficulties. Both 
are based on sentiment and state of mind, either at the individual or mass 
levels, 'hard' evidence of which tends to be elusive even with regard to 
more open Western societies. To make out a case for either of these two 
models requires either detailed psychological study of individual communist 
rulers (such as Tucker's biography of the younger Stalin), or, in the 
case of the 'reactive' theory, concrete sociological analysis of a given 
society at a given time, using survey or other such data.
Neither of the above is attempted in the present study. What this 
analysis does attempt, however, is to judge whether the other two more 
widely encountered and influential theories positing elite manipulation 
of unchanging national sentiment can assist us towards an understanding 
of the communist uses of nationalism. They offer, by contrast, the 
possibility of their being tested by means of research involving relatively 
easily available documents. In the case of 'deradicalisation', if it 
proves correct, we should find not only the emergence of increasingly 
overt state-sanctioned nationalism, but evidence of an ever greater 
reliance by the authorities on the national sentiment of the major ethnic 
group under their control. If the 'tactical' model, by contrast, is an 
accurate guide, we should find an unchanging (rather than incrementally 
more extreme) official nationalism, but only occasionally and temporarily 
in situations of perceived domestic or foreign threat.
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The four ’theories' of communist nationalism outlined above are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, and it is certainly not the case that 
this complex phenomenon can be explained by a single factor which excludes 
all others. This study does not, therefore, attempt to judge definitively 
the correct balance of factors which have permitted the emergence of 
official nationalism in the three Marxist-Leninist states considered.
Rather, it attempts to answer part of this question, and in so doing, 
to reveal some clues as to this aspect of the behaviour of such states 
in general.
Within these limitations, the study proposes the following 
arguments.
The case of the USSR suggests that elements of 'deradicalisation' 
and 'tactical opportunism' account for aspects of the use by the Soviet 
state of Russian nationalism, but are also misleading and obscure important 
aspects of its exploitation as much as they are enlightening. Neither 
draws out the fact that the USSR has permitted the exploitation of Russian 
nationalism only in the context of 'communist nationalism', it having 
been resolved at a relatively early point in the development of Soviet 
communism that appeals to both Russian nationalism and orthodox Marxism- 
Leninism were necessary to ensure the survival of the state and its 
ruling elite. This doctrinal hybridisation has been retained since this 
decision, without essential changes by successive leaderships.
The case of the exploitation by the GDR of German national sentiment - 
represents a more persuasive vindication of elements of the 'deradicalisation' 
thesis as argued by a number of its proponents, occurring, as it does 
during the 'post-mobilisational' phase of the GDR's development, following 
the failure of other potential generators of legitimacy to produce 
enthusiasm for, or loyalty to, the state. Again, however, and as we would 
expect, the official exploitation of the national sentiment of the 
population has been combined with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consistent 
with our hypothesis of official restraint, the GDR desisted from attempts 
to encourage feelings of German nationalism until the mid-1970s, that 
is, so long as the authorities took the doctrinal position that there was 
a single Germany whose reunification should be worked for - or encouraged 
a view of the nation as wider than the state.
14
Communist Yugoslavia, in revealing state-sponsored nationalism 
as the exception rather than the rule, suggests only the 'tactical' 
explanation in the regime's occasional acquiescence in Serbian nationalism. 
Like the case of the GDR until the mid-1970s, the history of post-war 
Yugoslavia suggests that the lack of congruence between nation and state 
has acted as an important restraining influence on the development of 
such an ideological shift.
The three case studies reveal that while elements of the two 
models analysed are useful and indeed necessary to an explanation of 
the phenomenon, neither is capable of accounting for the pattern or degree 
of its manifestation - either in any one state or comparatively within 
the 'type' selected. The study also reveals little apparent correlation 
between the ethnic structure - or 'situation' - of the three case studies 
and the level of likelihood of their resorting to appeals to the 
nationalism of their dominant (or single) ethnic group. The ethnic 
'situation' of both the GDR and Yugoslavia appears to have been a decisive 
restraining factor in this area, in contrast to the markedly less inhibited 
behaviour of the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, elements of the two 
theories are useful, and, indeed, essential to any explanation of the 
phenomenon.
To support these arguments, documents reflecting the official
attitude to the chief spheres in which 'nationalism' and 'internationalism'
emerge in the behaviour of each of the three communist states are
analysed. The spheres which are most important in this connection are
the official view of the pre-revolutionary history of the dominant (or
single) ethnic group and of its cultural heritage. In addition, in the
cases of the multinational states, the USSR and Yugoslavia, the
'internationalism' of nationality policies which genuinely attempt to
cater for cultural equality may be contrasted with the 'nationalism' of
policies which take less account of the rights of minority, or non-core
nationalities, such as assimilationism. As such, it is hoped at least
in part to correct the divorce observed by Mary McAuley, between those
interested in nationalism and those interested in the nationality question
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in Marxist-Leninist states. In the Soviet case, official doctrine on 
the role and status of the Russian people in the USSR is also of importance.
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The various regimes’ view of the pre-revolutionary history of their 
dominant (or single) ethnic group, their cultural heritage, and, in 
the case of the USSR, doctrine on the role and status of the Russian 
people in the Soviet Union, are therefore analysed as the principal 
criteria in assessing the validity of the various theories of the 
official uses of the nationalism of the dominant ethnic group in the 
three selected case studies. Of course, the balance between nationalism 
and internationalism may also be observed in such areas as political 
practice, institutional arrangements and economic policies. Where it 
is considered appropriate in the course of the analysis, evidence 
relating to such secondary spheres is also presented.
The longer history of communism in the USSR by contrast with 
the GDR and Yugoslavia and, accordingly, the larger amount of evidence 
to be considered, dictate that a disproportionate amount of the study 
is devoted to the Soviet case. Chapters I, II and III, therefore 
concerned with the USSR, consider the Soviet case with regard, 
respectively, to the three major political eras of the post-Lenin 
period, those dominated by Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev. For 
background purposes, the policies which preceded Stalin’s 'communist 
nationalist’ revolution after the Bolshevik Revolution are examined 
in the Appendix. Chapters IV and V consider the cases of the GDR and 
Yugoslavia, respectively.
A wide range of relevant newspapers, journals, books and 
pamphlets, both primary and secondary, have been surveyed and used as 
source material for the study.
16
Introduction - Notes
1. Hans Kohn, 'Nationalism', in David L. Sills, International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York, 1972, p. 63.
As to some of Kohn's more questionable writings, such as what 
has come to be referred to as the 'Hans Kohn dichotomy' which 
distinguishes between the nationalism of Western Europe and 
the nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe, see Andrzej 
Walicki's critique, largely based on the case of Poland,
'Polish Romanticism: The Meanings of the National Idea',
Reports on Philosophy, 1981, no. 5.
2. See, for example, Eugene Kamenka, 'Political Nationalism -
the Evolution of the Idea' in Eugene Kamenka, ed., Nationalism:
The Nature and Evolution of an Idea, Canberra; ANU Press, 1975; 
Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism, London; 
Methuen, 1977, Chapter 1.
3. The major issue in this sphere has been the precise chronology 
of the appearance of the phenomenon. The influential view of 
Karl Deutsch and the 'Chicago School', largely based on the 
United States' immigration experience, was that while nationalism 
was a significant feature of the early stages of the 'social 
mobilisation' process, this process increasingly broke down
ties of kinship, and induced increasing loyalty to the modernising 
state. See Nationalism and Social Communication: An Enquiry 
into the Foundations of Nationality, New York and London:
Cambridge UP, 1953. The subsequent experience of ethnic 
separatism in such developed states as Canada, Britain, France, 
and Belgium, however, suggested that nationalism, on the contrary, 
was linked to a 'post-mobilisational' phase. This induced a 
radical reformulation of theory and the realisation that the 
ethnic assimilation which could be argued in the case of the 
United States was largely inapplicable to non-immigrant multi­
ethnic societies. On this question, see Walker Connor, 
'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' World Politics, XXIV,
No. 3 (April 1972), esp. pp. 319-57; and Sami Zubaida,
'Theories of Nationalism', in Gary Littlejohn et al, Power 
and the State, London; Croom Helm, 1978.
4. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell,
1983, p. 1.
5. Henry Krisch, 'Political Legitimation in the German Democratic 
Republic', in T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds, Political 
Legitimation in Communist States, Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1982, 
passim.
6. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, 
London and New York: Cambridge UP, 1974, pp. 9-10.
17
7. R.F. Miller suggested this term to me, also used by Tadeusz 
Szafar, as a neat formulation of the phenomenon under analysis.
As stressed later in the introduction, it should not be confused 
with 'National Communism' which has been used to refer to 
communist states which have departed from the Soviet political 
model and sphere of influence. Thus Anthony D. Smith's chapter 
'Communist Nationalism' actually refers to 'National Communism'.
See Anthony D. Smith, ed., Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 
Canberra: ANU Press, 1979. Of course most of those concerned 
with the phenomenon of nationalism in communist states have 
been concerned with the spontaneous separatist or minority 
variety. Some recent examples of the recent burgeoning literature 
in this area would include Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline
of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, New 
York: Newsweek, 1982; Georg Brunner and Boris Meissner, 
Nationalitaetenprobleme in der Sowjetunion und Osteuropa, Cologne, 
Markus Verlag, 1982; K.C. Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 
Post-Stalin Era: Myths, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities 
Policy, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.
8 . 'Communist nationalism' has, of course, taken a variety of forms 
depending on the historical and cultural background of a given 
communist state. It has manifested itself as diversely as the 
near-worship of Mao's calligraphy, the Albanian cult of the 
medieval national hero Skenderbeg, Romania's preoccupation with 
its national origins, and the claims of the Khmer Rouge regarding 
the national authenticity of the poorest strata of the peasantry.
For the case of China, see A. Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage:
China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era, Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institute, 1974, and Peter Zwick, National Communism, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1983, esp. pp. 153-171. For Albania, 
see Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle, Albania Defiant, New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1976. For Romania see Attila Kovari,
The Antecedents of Today's National myth in Rumania, 1921-1965, 
Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem Soviet and East 
European Research Centre, 1983, and Zwick, o p . cit., esp. pp. 116-25. 
For Cambodia, see Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, Bungay: 
Penguin, 1977.
9. With regard to these states, see Zwick, op. cit., passim. See 
also Michael Chesinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism and 
Anti-Semitism, New York: Karz-Cohl Publishing, 1982, esp.
Chapter 17; Owen Lattimore, Nationalism and Revolution in 
Mongolia, New York, 1955; Robert A. Rupen, 'Mongolian Nationalism', 
Royal Central Asian Journal, XLV (1958); Martin Kenner and
James Petras, Fidel Castro Speaks, London: Allen Lane, 1970, 
esp. Part III, 'The Cuban Road to Communism'; Andres Suarez,
Cuba: Castroism and Communism 1959-1966, Cambridge, Ma.: MIT 
Press, 1967; Stephen B. Young, 'Communism and Nationalism in 
Vietnam' (Review Article), Problems of Communism, 1981, March-April.
10. See Robert C. Tucker, 'The Deradicalisation of Marxist Movements',
American Political Science Review, 61 no. 2 (June 1967), pp. 343-58; 
and Robert Wesson, The Aging of Communism, New York: Praeger, 1980. 
For a reformulation of the argument of Tucker in the 'Political 
Culturalist' phraseology, see 'Culture, Political Culture and 
Communist Society', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 8 8 , no. 2 
(June 1973), pp. 173-190. ' " ^
18
11. Tucker, 'The Deradicalisation ...', loc. cit., pp. 347-8.
12. Leszek Kotakowski , 'Ideology in Eastern Europe' in M.D. Drachkovitch, 
ed., East Central Europe: Yesterday-Today-Tomorrow, Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1982.
13. See Victor Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stalinist State: Class, Ethnicity 
and Consensus in Soviet Society, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1982, 
and 'Socioeconomic Inequality and Changes in Soviet Ideology',
Theory and Society, 1980, no. 9; Peter Christian Ludz, 
Ideologiebegriff und Marxistische Theorie: Ansatze Zu Einer 
Immanenten Kritik, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976,
pp. 92-93; Henry Krisch, loc. cit.; Maria Markus, 'Overt and 
Covert Modes of Legitimation in East European Societies' in ibid.
See also R. Lowenthal, 'The Ruling Party in a Mature Society' 
in M.G. Field, ed., Social Consequences of Modernisation in 
Communist Societies, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
14. See Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies' 
in the Contemporary USSR, Berkeley: Institute of International 
Studies of the University of California, 1978. For an article 
typical of justifiably unfavourable reviews of Yanov's work,
see Darrell P. Hammer, 'Russian Nationalism and the "Yanov Thesis'", 
Religion in Communist Lands, no. 3 (1982), pp. 310-316. Also 
see Paul Lendvai, Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism 
in the Balkans, New York: Doubleday, 1969, p. 20; Wesson, 
op. cit., p. 158.
15. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 11-12.
16. S. Enders Wimbush, 'The Russian Nationalist Backlash', Survey,
Summer 1979, p. 48.
17. Bogdan D. Denitch, The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav 
Case, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976, p. 197.
18. Andrew C. Janos, 'Ethnicity, Communism and Political Change in 
Eastern Europe' World Politics, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (1971), p. 519; 
George Klein and Milan J. Reban, eds, The Politics of Ethnicity 
in Eastern Europe, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 3.
>
19. Archie Brown, 'Introduction' in Archie Brown and Jack Grey, eds, 
Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, London: 
Macmillan, 1977, p. 5. Hans Kohn has produced perhaps the most 
extreme 'tactical' interpretation, arguing the almost total 
disappearance of communist nationalism since Stalin's time.
'The Herrenvolk concepts of Poles, Serbs and Czechs have disappeared, 
and that of the Russians has been wisely controlled since Khrushchev 
came to power' he argues (in a work published in 1971). He sees 
Russian nationalism as restricted to 'a small group around the 
journal Molodaia Gvardiia'. 'Soviet Communism and Nationalism:
Three Stages of a Historical Development' in Edward Allworth, ed., 
Soviet Nationality Problems, New York and London: Columbia 
University Press, 1971, p. 6 6 .
19
20. Henry Krisch, 'Nation Building and Regime Stability in the 
GDR', East-Central Europe, vol. 3, part 1 (1976), p. 16.
21. Ibid., p. 17.
22. Jack V. Haney, 'The Revival of Interest in the Russian Past in 
the Soviet Union', Slavic Review, no. 4 (December 1973); Roy 
Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy, London: Macmillan 1975,
p. 90; Ludmila Alexeeva, 'The Russian National Movement' 
(unpublished paper), 1982; Thomas E. Bird, 'New Interest in 
Old Russian Things: Literary Ferment, Religious Perspectives 
and National Self-Assertion', Slavic Review, no. 4 (December 
1973).
23. Mary McAuley, 'In Search of Nationalism in the USSR' (unpublished 
paper presented at the NASEES Annual Conference, Cambridge,
March, 1982), p. 6 ; Gail Lapidus, 'The Rise of Ethnonationalism 
in the USSR - The Limits of National Self-Assertion' (unpublished 
paper) 1983.
24. John B. Dunlop, 'Review', Soviet Studies, no. 4 (October), 1979, 
p. 608.
25. See Alexeeva, loc. cit., and Lapidus, loc. cit.
26. Zeline Amen Ward, 'Minority Politics in the GDR: Problematics 
of Socialist Legitimacy and National Autonomy' in Klein and 
Reban, eds., o p . cit., p. 90.
27. See George Schopflin, 'The Ideology of Croatian Nationalism', 
Survey, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1973); Denitch, o p . cit.,
pp. 196-7; Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National 
Question, New York and London: Columbia UP, 1968, pp. 189, 215.
28. This term was suggested to me by T.H. Rigby.
29. See Robert Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study
in History and Personality, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973, 
esp. pp. 137-143.
30. Adam Ulam, 'Russian Nationalism', in Seweryn Bailer, ed., The 
Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, Boulder: F.A. Praeger 
1981, pp. 9-10.
31. See T.H. Rigby, 'Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber, and 
Communist Mono-organisational Systems' in Rigby and Feher,
op. cit.
32. Archie Brown, 'Eastern Europe: 1968, 1978, 1998', Daedalus, 
vol. 108, no. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 151-74. Ronald Asmus has 
formulated a similar argument in relation to the GDR. See 
'Variations on a Theme: The Concept of the Nation in the GDR', 
(unpublished paper), April 1981.
33. McAuley, loc. cit.
